BlackTree Security · Infrastructure · Automation · AI

Binance Says Its Signing Service Was Used in a $6.34 Billion Attack

Binance says attackers reached an internal wallet-signing service on 29 October 2026 and used it to initiate transactions outside the exchange’s normal withdrawal process. The company places approximately $6.34 billion in digital assets inside the incident, making the failure less about one stolen password than about which systems were trusted to request and authorise movement from hot wallets.

Update, 31 October: The FBI attributed the theft to North Korea’s TraderTraitor activity and published addresses connected to the stolen assets.

Update, 3 November: Binance published preliminary findings, including a timeline, its current account of the intrusion and updated asset figures. The investigation and an independent review remained open.

The signing service became the transaction path

Binance says the first burst began between 20:05 and 20:09 UTC, when five hot wallets sent 233.46 million XRP to an attacker-controlled address. Further transfers involved SOL, OP and 18,270 BTC. The attacker then used Ethereum’s EIP-7702 mechanism to establish malicious delegation authorisations on a hot wallet.

Suspending ordinary withdrawals did not immediately stop those on-chain permissions. Binance says the wallet used multi-party computation, so there was no single private key available to revoke the delegations at once. The final unauthorised transfer, involving 2,961.9 ETH, completed at 23:56 UTC after previously remaining pending. At 00:10 UTC on 30 October, Binance cleared the delegation code with a new authorisation to the zero address.

This does not establish a general weakness in EIP-7702 or multi-party computation. Binance’s account describes an attacker who had already reached systems permitted to request wallet signatures. The control question is whether a technically valid signing request also reflected a separately approved business intent.

The preliminary path began with developer compromise

The company’s current reconstruction describes a multi-stage campaign. In September, a software engineer accepted a fake recruitment interview and downloaded a malicious assignment repository onto a work computer. Binance says the malware replaced a legitimate development component, communicated with attacker infrastructure and evaded the endpoint protection then in place.

On 20 October, according to the report, the attacker used an internal AI tool as a springboard to reach two more engineers and discovered a container-deployment token. On 29 October, the attacker allegedly used compromised computers and credentials to deploy a container and trigger the script that reached wallet-signing operations.

These are Binance’s preliminary findings, not a completed independent forensic report. The company says affected systems and devices were rebuilt or replaced, related credentials were retired and wallet-service controls were strengthened. Its external review was still being commissioned when the update appeared.

Three large figures describe different things

Binance says approximately $6.34 billion in assets was affected. As of 3 November, it said approximately $2.85 billion had been frozen or intercepted, with both figures subject to reconciliation and market-price movements.

The exchange also said that 98% of the affected token assets had been replenished by 31 October and that it would absorb the financial impact instead of users. Replenishment means Binance replaced assets in its reserves. It does not mean 98% of the stolen assets had been recovered from the attacker, and it is not a final net-loss figure.

The FBI’s statement uses a separate measure, describing theft of more than $6 billion and attributing it to TraderTraitor. It also warns that the actors were converting assets primarily into Ether and expected further laundering through decentralised-finance and instant-swap services.

What customers and custodians should take from it

Binance customers should use only the official application and website for recovery or account messages, review recent sessions and API keys, and treat unsolicited offers to release frozen withdrawals as likely fraud. The company has promised to cover the loss, but customers should not interpret that commitment as proof that every account or data question is closed.

Other custodians should test whether developer endpoints, deployment tokens or internal automation can reach signing workflows without an independent transaction policy. Incident exercises should include rapid revocation of existing on-chain permissions, not only a switch that pauses normal withdrawals.

The final amount recovered, the lasting net loss, the independent review’s conclusions and the complete intrusion path remain unresolved. The confirmed lesson is narrower: protecting cryptographic keys is not enough when compromised internal services can still ask those keys to approve an attacker’s transaction.

Sources: Binance preliminary findings, published 3 November 2026; FBI TraderTraitor attribution and address list, published 31 October 2026.

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