The Provenance Was Valid. The Workflow Let Anyone Publish the Malware.
Ten malicious npm releases carried valid provenance because an outsider could drive the project’s trusted GitHub Actions publishing workflow.
Software Supply Chain
Artifactory’s Default Configuration Could Give an Unauthenticated Attacker Admin Access.
JFrog fixed a critical Artifactory authentication bypass that can grant administrative privileges without credentials under the default configuration.
GitLab’s Claude Agent Read User-Controlled Configuration. Developer Access Reached Arbitrary CI Commands.
GitLab patched a Duo Claude flaw that let a Developer turn user-controlled configuration into arbitrary commands inside a CI job.
The Package Wasn’t the Payload. Its Trusted Mirror Was the Phishing Site.
Attackers used npm packages as storage for fake verification pages rendered through trusted mirrors, turning legitimate CDN domains into phishing infrastructure.
The Package Worked. A Single Import Started RedC2’s Linux Backdoor.
Fourteen functional npm utilities launched a native Linux backdoor when imported, bypassing install-hook defences and giving RedC2 an AI-assisted post-exploitation path.
An Agentic Attack Framework Was Managing 23,800 Stolen Secrets
Google found an agentic attack framework managing more than 23,800 harvested secrets. In a separate operation, another framework built and launched a credential campaign in under six hours.
One Click in github.dev Could Reach Every Repository the Developer Could.
A malicious notebook could turn github.dev into a GitHub OAuth-token theft path with read and write access across the developer's repositories.
Notepad++ Downloaded the Update. It Never Checked Who Made It.
Attackers exploited Notepad++ update verification failures to redirect users toward malicious installers while official repository files remained clean.