BlackTree Security · Infrastructure · Automation · AI

Copied Websites Hid a Chrome-to-Windows Exploit Chain

The fake site looked convincing because most of it was real. It loaded content from the organisation it impersonated, then added one invisible frame containing two Chrome exploits, a Windows privilege-escalation exploit and a new backdoor.

Volexity says a Chinese threat actor it tracks as UTA0565 used the chain on 3 and 4 September before the chain was fully patched. The individual fix dates need the qualification below. The targets included Asian government organisations and recipients of a message impersonating the Center for American Progress.

Update, 31 October 2026: separate the attack dates from the fix dates

Google’s 3 September release notice announced the first browser fix in 152.0.7977.82 for Linux and 152.0.7977.82 or .83 for Windows and macOS. Its 8 September notice included the other browser fix in 153.0.8010.36 for Linux and 153.0.8010.36 or .37 for Windows and macOS. The Microsoft CNA record was published with the Windows fix on 8 September.

Volexity reports campaign dates of 3 and 4 September without precise attack times. The chain was not fully patched, but the available evidence does not establish that all three vulnerabilities lacked an available fix throughout both days. The September browser builds above are historical first-fix boundaries. Use the currently supported Chrome release and applicable Windows updates for deployment now; our current Chrome release review covers the newer browser fixes.

The browser CNA descriptions identify V8 memory-safety flaws allowing execution inside the sandbox. The Windows ALPC heap-buffer-overflow issue is a local elevation-of-privilege step whose CNA record requires an authorised attacker. Treat browser execution and privilege escalation as separate stages when validating coverage.

The exploit kit had already moved between actors

The hidden frame carried exploitation for CVE-2026-85046 and CVE-2026-87491 in Chrome, followed by CVE-2026-85880 in Windows. Volexity had already reported two different Chinese groups using the same core chain. The later campaign shows a third actor adapting the delivery around cloned websites.

That does not prove the groups are one organisation. Volexity assesses that the kit was probably shared, customised and weaponised within the wider Chinese cyber-espionage community.

The final payload was built to look like browser maintenance

The page downloaded a file named chrome_cleanup.exe, removed its Mark of the Web and launched it through the Windows shell. Volexity calls the previously undocumented malware CLEANGULP.

CLEANGULP installs under a Microsoft IME-themed path, creates a scheduled task and supports command execution, process listing, file upload, file download and beacon-object-file execution. Its command traffic uses HTTP, but the body is encrypted and Base64 encoded with a custom alphabet.

What defenders should look for now

  • Confirm managed Chrome and Windows systems have the fixes for all three vulnerabilities, not only the browser update.
  • Search email and proxy logs for the reported typosquatted domains and related infrastructure.
  • Hunt for chrome_cleanup.exe, the MicrosoftIME scheduled task and unexpected execution from the reported local application-data path.
  • Inspect pages that load most content from a legitimate domain while adding hidden local frames or scripts.
  • Treat a browser crash or update prompt during a targeted visit as a possible exploitation signal, and investigate it alongside the campaign evidence. Neither event alone proves exploitation.

Vendor patches address the reported vulnerabilities; verify their applicability and deployment on each managed system. The delivery lesson survives them: a cloned site does not need to reproduce every page perfectly when it can quietly borrow the original and hide the dangerous part where the visitor never looks.

Sources

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