EvilTokens Compromised 12,000 Inboxes and Let AI Choose the Next Victim
The most dangerous feature of EvilTokens was not its phishing page. It was what happened after the victim signed in.
Microsoft’s 22 September 2026 analysis says the cybercrime service was linked to more than 12,000 compromised inboxes across over 10,000 organisations within months of appearing in February 2026. Once a token unlocked a mailbox, an AI assistant could search its contents, map roles and permissions, identify trusted relationships and recommend whom a criminal should impersonate to make fraud succeed.
Microsoft and Health-ISAC announced the disruption on 22 September 2026, following legal and technical action. Partners seized 50 websites and disabled more than 150 additional domains, while the Metropolitan Police arrested two men on suspicion of offences connected with the alleged operation. Microsoft’s announcement says the men were released on conditional police bail while the investigation continued. Arrest is not a conviction, and a civil disruption order is not a criminal verdict. Arrests and infrastructure seizures do not eliminate copied kits, affiliates or already stolen tokens, so defenders still need to look for the attack chain inside their own tenants.
The real Microsoft sign-in page completed the attack
EvilTokens abused Microsoft’s legitimate device-code authentication flow. The device-authorisation protocol exists for devices such as televisions, printers and conference-room systems that cannot easily present a full sign-in experience.
The attacker initiated the flow and sent the victim a code through a lure. The victim was then directed to the genuine microsoft.com/devicelogin page. Entering the code and completing authentication authorised the attacker’s waiting session. The user could see the correct domain, use the correct password and satisfy multifactor authentication while still handing access to the wrong device.
Microsoft observed EvilTokens customers using 44 themes, including invoices, requests for proposals, shared files and password-expiry notices. Redirects through reputable cloud platforms and compromised domains helped the traffic blend into normal business activity.
AI turned mailbox access into an organisational map
Traditional business email compromise already depends on understanding trust: who approves payments, which supplier is expected to invoice, how an executive speaks and when a transaction will attract the least suspicion. That reconnaissance takes time.
EvilTokens industrialised it. Microsoft says the service used AI to identify users in financial, executive and administrative roles, examine wire-transfer details and pending invoices, and help draft messages that impersonated trusted contacts. Microsoft Graph access could also reveal organisational structure and sensitive permissions almost as soon as a token was captured.
In some cases, attackers registered a new device and obtained a Primary Refresh Token within ten minutes. Other operators waited before creating inbox rules or removing email, trading speed for stealth.
This is the deeper change. Generative AI does not need to discover a new exploit to alter the economics of intrusion. It can compress the slow human work between initial access and profitable abuse.
What Microsoft 365 defenders should change
- Block device-code flow where it is not needed. Follow the Teams-specific guidance: identify genuine device resource accounts, test in report-only mode, retain emergency access, and exclude the Device Registration Service resource from the blocking policy. An account exception can permit other applications as well, so document its owner, monitor membership and avoid broad user exclusions. Review approved non-Teams dependencies before enforcement.
- Detect the sequence. Correlate device-code sign-ins with token exchange, device registration, unusual Microsoft Graph activity and new inbox rules.
- Treat the real login page as part of the lure. Train users to verify the application and the action being authorised, not only the domain in the address bar.
- Respond to tokens, not just passwords. Follow Microsoft’s account-response guidance: disable a compromised account during investigation, revoke sessions and refresh tokens, remove unauthorised devices and authentication methods, and review applications, assigned roles, forwarding and hidden inbox rules. Restore access after the investigation and necessary credential reset.
- Investigate the mailbox as a map of future victims. Identify invoices, trusted contacts and internal roles exposed through the compromised account, then warn the people most likely to receive a convincing follow-on request. UK business guidance recommends verifying payment changes by phoning a known trusted contact, rather than replying to the potentially compromised email.
Microsoft warns that ordinary session revocation may leave existing access tokens valid for up to an hour. That is enough time for a hands-on attacker to act. The separate access-revocation guidance explains that access-token lifetime and application-issued sessions have their own enforcement. Continuous access evaluation can shorten the window for supported applications. Verify the affected service’s actual behaviour rather than assuming a revocation click ended every session instantly.
BlackTree recently covered passkey-themed social engineering that reached identity and cloud data. This is a different campaign and does not establish a shared operator. EvilTokens reinforces the same uncomfortable point: a security control can be technically intact while a victim is persuaded to authorise the attacker’s session.
The service has been disrupted. The business model has not. Any organisation that leaves device-code authentication broadly available while monitoring only passwords is protecting the secret attackers may no longer need.
Sources
- Microsoft Threat Intelligence analysis of EvilTokens, published 22 September 2026.
- Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit disruption announcement, published 22 September 2026.
- Microsoft EvilTokens legal pleadings.


